










Assessment Drives Learning 
The Effect of Central Exit Exams on Curricular Knowledge 







CLAUS H. CARSTENSEN 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2666 




An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Assessment Drives Learning 
The Effect of Central Exit Exams on Curricular Knowledge 





In this paper, we use data from the German PISA 2003 sample to study the effects of central 
exit examinations on student performance, student attitudes, and teacher behavior. Unlike 
earlier studies we use (i) a value-added measure to pin down the effect of central exit exams 
on learning in the last year before the exam and (ii) separate test scores for mathematical 
literacy and curriculum-based knowledge. The findings indicate that central exit exams only 
improve curriculum-based knowledge but do not affect mathematical literacy. Moreover, 
teachers in German states with central exit examinations are more active and tend to be more 
performance oriented. Students, although showing a better performance, are less motivated in 
school. 
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In this  paper, we present  new evidence on the effects  of state-mandated graduation 
exams or central exit examinations (CEEs) on educational outcomes in German secondary 
schools.  The  existing  literature  on  CEE  effects  reaches  fairly  unanimous  conclusions. 
Theoretically, centralized examinations yield positive effects on student achievement because 
of incentive effects on teachers and students (Costrell, 1997; Effinger and Polborn, 1999; 
Jürges, Richter, and Schneider, 2005). This prediction is matched by the empirical literature, 
although estimated effect sizes vary substantially depending on the data and identification 
strategy (Bishop, 1997, 1999; Jürges, Schneider, and Büchel, 2005; Wößmann, 2002). Given 
the beneficial effect on student achievement and provided that introducing central exit exams 
requires little additional monetary resources, one might be tempted to close the case. But low 
monetary costs do not mean that central exit exams are costless. Achievement gains might be 
costly for students and teachers if they put forth more effort. It is certainly of interest to find 
out if such costs of higher achievement exist, what they are and who eventually bears them. 
Do  students  or  teachers  work  harder?  Does  teaching  quality,  a  key  factor  in  improving 
education, improve? (Scheerens, 2000; Scheerens and Bosker, 1997) Is learning becoming 
less fun? (Jürges and Schneider, 2009). 
The present study makes several contributions to the empirical literature on central exit 
exams. First, we use longitudinal data from the PISA-I Plus study, an extension of PISA 2003 
– with performance measured in ninth and tenth grade – to estimate the effect of central exit 
exams on student performance. Thus, in contrast to earlier studies, we can measure student 
achievement  as  value-added  in  the  last  year  before  the  exit  examination  in  nonacademic 
tracks. Second, we control for general cognitive skills of the students, as PISA-I 2003 also 
includes a cognitive ability test. 
Our third contribution is to differentiate achievement on test items referring to basic 
skills (mathematical literacy) and test items that reflect the German mathematics curriculum. 
This difference is important, because “PISA considers student knowledge […] not in isolation 
but in relation to students’ ability to reflect on their knowledge and experience and to apply 
them to real world issues.” (OECD, 2003, p. 24). This type of knowledge is different from the 
German curriculum, which is the binding standard for schools. In contrast to the regular PISA 
questions,  the  German  curriculum  requires  substantial  technical  and  conceptual  modeling 
abilities  in  mathematics  (Blum  et  al.,  2004).  With  our  data,  we  are  able  to  test  whether 2 
 
mathematical literacy and curricular knowledge are similarly affected by external standards. 
In that respect we can add new evidence to the “teaching to the test” question. 
Fourth, we exploit the fact that the German secondary school system is characterized by 
a fairly rigid system of early academic tracking. Our data contain information on students and 
teachers in nonacademic tracks (who graduate after grade 10) and students and teachers in 
academic tracks (who continue schooling until grade 12 or 13). While for nonacademic tracks 
we measure value-added immediately before exit examinations, exit exams in academic tracks 
are still two or three years ahead. For students in nonacademic tracks who are in 9
th and 10
th 
grade, the incentive effects of central exit exams are therefore expected to be stronger than for 
their peers in the academic track. Moreover, nonacademic track students in non-CEE states 
graduate  without  taking  an  additional  exit  exam.  A  leaving  certificate  is  awarded  upon 
successfully completing the final grade. At the end of the academic track, however, there are 
exit exams in all German states, but exit exams can be administered centrally or drafted and 
administered locally by teachers and schools. Finally, we aim at disentangling the effect of 
central  exit  exams  on  student  achievement  by  studying  student  and  teacher  attitudes  and 
behaviour as potentially important mediators in the relationship between central exit exams 
and student performance.  
Our findings are in line with earlier results on CEE-effects on student achievement in 
mathematics (Jürges, Schneider, and Büchel, 2005; Jürges and Schneider, 2009) and yield 
new insights into the mechanics of external standards. We show that the effects are significant 
only  for  curricular  knowledge,  whereas  mathematical  literacy  appears  not  to  be  affected. 
Further, central exit exams appear to matter significantly only for students in nonacademic 
tracks. Students  and teachers in 9
th and 10
th grade of the academic track, where students 
graduate  after  grade  12/13,  are  hardly  affected  by  central  exit  exams.  Moreover,  earlier 
findings that students incur costs in form of being less motivated and feeling higher pressure 
are  confirmed  and  teachers  in  states  with  central  exit  exams  are  more  active  and  more 
achievement oriented.  
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows:  in  Section  2,  we  describe  relevant  features  of  the 
German school system. In Section 3 we give a brief description of the PISA-I-Plus data. 
Sections 4 to 6 show our empirical strategy and estimation results for the effect of central exit 
examinations on student performance, student attitudes, and teacher behavior. Finally, we 
draw some conclusions in Section 7. 
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2. A primer on the German school system and recent reforms 
 
In  the  context  of  our  analysis,  the  German  school  system  has  two  important 
characteristics (a comprehensive description of the German school system can be found in 
Jonen and Eckardt (2004)). First, it is characterized by a distinct federal structure. The 16 
federal states have far-reaching autonomy in all education matters. The federal influence on 
education  policy  is  rather  weak  and  has  been  further  weakened  by  the  latest  reform  of 
federalism in Germany in 2006. As a result, the German school system is characterized by 
strong regional differences that tend to inhibit the mobility of families and teachers across 
German states. The diversity across states is often criticized, but the coexistence of various 
school systems within one country can be exploited for evaluation studies. 
One important cross-state difference is the existence of central exit examinations. In 
some of the states, central exit examinations exist since the end of World War II. Although 
central exit examinations have been an ideological battlefield in Germany ever since, there 
was no reform until very recently. While it was always argued that students from states with 
central exit examinations performed much better, reliable comparisons of student achievement 
across states with and without central exit exams (not to speak of causal analyses) have been 
virtually non-existent. This was mainly due to the lack of nationwide standardized tests. In 
response  to  this  lack  of  data,  the  Conference  of  State  Education  Ministries  (KMK) 
commissioned an extension to the OECD PISA 2000 study (PISA-E), boosting sample sizes 
and including questions that were more specific to the German schooling system. The results 
of PISA-E in 2000 did indeed reveal large differences in test scores between states and in 
particular between states with and without exit exams. In response, all except one federal state 
have introduced central exit exams, however, without any reference to empirical evidence that 
observed differences in achievement are causally linked to central exit examinations. Further, 
a  group  of  seven  (since  2008:  twelve)  German  federal  states  have  introduced  regular 
standardized tests of student skills at different grades in primary and secondary schools. 
One reason for this recent zeal in education policy was the tremendous effect that the 
publication of the international PISA 2000 results had on the German public. In contrast to 
German self-perception, student achievement proved to be at most average in international 
comparison. Since then, concerns were growing about a declining quality of education in 
German schools (of which 95% are public) and a decreasing international competitiveness of 
the German labor force. 4 
 
A second salient feature of the German school system is the rigid tracking in secondary 
schools. After primary school (usually at the age of ten), students are allocated to one of three 
types  of  secondary  schools:  two  nonacademic  tracks  (basic  and  intermediate),  and  an 
academic track. Requirements for graduation differ across these tracks. Graduating from the 
academic  track  (in  grade  12  or  13),  which  is  equivalent  to  a  general  university-entrance 
certificate, requires passing an exit exam in every state. In some states, these exams are state-
mandated, and in others they are designed at each individual school (subject to state-wide 
guidelines). A typical exit examination in academic tracks consists of four to five subjects. 
The choice of subjects is limited and varies from state to state, but mathematics was not 
mandatory in 2003 (the year that is relevant for our analysis). 
 
Table 1. Overview of Central Exit Exams in Germany in 2003 





Baden-Württemberg  X  X  X 
Bavaria  X  X  X 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania    X  X 
Saarland  X  X  X 
Saxony  X  X  X 
Saxony-Anhalt  X  X  X 
Thuringia  X  X  X 
No  Central  Exit  Exams  in  Berlin,  Bremen,  Hamburg,  Lower  Saxony,  North  Rhine-Westphalia,  Rhineland-Palatinate, 




Leaving certificates for basic tracks are awarded upon completion of grade 9 or 10, 
depending on the state. Leaving certificates for intermediate tracks are awarded after grade 
10. In some states, the leaving certificate requires passing a central exit examination. Table 1 
describes the situation in 2003/04, the years in which the PISA-I-Plus data were collected. 
Hesse and Brandenburg were excluded from the analysis because they introduced CEEs in 
2003/04, the year of the PISA-I study. Hence students were in grade 9 immediately before 
CEEs were introduced and in grade 10, when CEEs just had been introduced. It is therefore 
not clear how to treat the two states. Seven states had central exit examinations at the end of 
the intermediate track, and six had CEEs at the end of the basic track. In contrast to academic 
tracks, there is only limited choice of subjects in the exit exams. Written exams in German 
and mathematics are compulsory subjects in all central exit examinations. Science on the 5 
 





We use data from PISA-I-Plus, an extension to PISA 2003 for Germany. Compared to 
the original PISA study design, this extension has several distinct characteristics. First, in 
contrast  to  the  original  PISA  sample  design  that  includes  15  year  olds,  the  PISA-I-Plus 
baseline sample consisted exclusively of 9th-graders. Second, students had to sit two test 
days. On the first day, they were given the common set of international mathematics, science, 
and reading items. On the second day, students were given national test items. While the 
international  test  items  focused  on  "mathematical  literacy",  i.e.,  the  capacity  to  use 
mathematical skills in everyday contexts, the national items were designed to test curricular 
knowledge. Third, students were tested again one year later in 2004, when they were in 10
th
 
grade. This allows us to use achievement gains as outcomes. Fourth, in addition to testing 
students  and  gathering  information  from  student  questionnaires,  PISA-I-Plus  has  also 
interviewed teachers about attitudes and teaching practices.  
Although  our  data  have  many  advantages  compared  to  the  regular  PISA  data,  the 
longitudinal design also has some limitations. Students who repeat 9
th grade, who change 
schools, or who leave school after grade 9 are not followed (due to the latter restriction, we 
excluded all students in basic tracks from our analyses). The sample thus becomes selective in 
terms of socio-economic background and achievement. Compared to the full sample of 9
th 
graders, there are more girls than boys, less students with immigration background and higher 
average test scores. To account for selectivity based on observable covariates, we use survey 
weights, so that the samples are representative for the secondary school types in Germany 
(Prenzel et al., 2006, pp. 46-49, 54-56). 
The sample used in the analysis consists of 4,928 students, of which 2,599 students are 
enrolled in nonacademic track schools (with graduation after grade 10) and 2,329 students are 
enrolled in the academic track school (with graduation after grade 12 or 13 years). The data 





4. Effect of exit exams on student achievement 
 
4.1 Empirical strategy 
 
In  this  section  we  report  empirical  estimates  for  the  effect  of  exit  examinations  on 
student achievement. The basic specification is the simple education production function: 
 
(1)  iGc iGc iGc iGc iGc e X d a y  
 
This  equation  models  mathematics  achievement  y  of  student  i  in  grade  G  (grade  10)  in 
classroom  c  as  a  function  of  unobserved  skill  a,  exam  regime  d,  family  (and  other) 
background variables X, and a random (measurement) error term e. For sake of simplicity, we 
leave out teacher, school, and peer effects. Note that unobserved skill, a, is modeled as a time-
varying  variable,  i.e.,  skill  is  explicitly  allowed  to  evolve  over  time.  We  can  think  of 
unobserved skill as being a function of the history of all external influences on ability (family, 
peers,  teachers,  schools)  and  of  innate  learning  capacity.  A  value-added  specification  of 
equation  (1)  that  includes  achievement  in  grade  1 G   (i.e.  grade  9)  along  with 
contemporaneous  family  characteristics  and  a  contemporaneous  exam  regime  dummy  is 
specified in (2). 
 
(2)  iGc iGc iGc c G i iG iGc e X d y y ) 1 (  
 
where  iG  denotes innate learning capacity of student i in grade G and   is a parameter that 
measures how past experiences and acquired knowledge persist into the future. Note that 
c G i y ) 1 (  also contains past effects of the exam regime. Hence by estimating equation (2), we 
control  for  long-term  effects  of  central  e xit  examinations  on  student  attainment.  More 
importantly, including achievement in grade 9 helps to identify the causal effect of CEEs. The 
potential policy endogeneity of CEEs that has been discussed in detail in the literature (e.g. 
Jürges, Schneider, and Büchel, 2005) is taken care of in  equation (2). For instance, if  the 
decision to introduce CEEs depends on the valuation of education in a state and the attitude 
towards education also affects academic achievement, simple differences between CEE and 
non-CEE states do not estimate the causal effect of CEEs. Including achievement in grade 9, 7 
 
however, controls for the influence of unobserved parental preferences for education up to 
grade  9.  Hence  our  coefficient  of  interest, ,  shows  the  immediate  effect  of  central  exit 
examinations on achievement in grade 10 controlling for past effects. 
In the following, we estimate four different versions of equation (2) – with standard 
errors  that  account  for  stratification  and  clustering  of  the  sample.  First,  we  differentiate 
between  students  in  nonacademic  and  in  academic  tracks.  For  each  track  type,  we  then 
estimate a production function for mathematical literacy and for curricular knowledge. For 
each individual, we have two test scores for each concept, one in grade 9 and one in grade 10. 
In equation (2),  iGc y  represents the test score in grade 10, and  c G i y ) 1 (  represents the test 
score in grade 9. Note that test items in grades 9 and 10 were not the same. Each test was an 
independent assessment of mathematical literacy and curricular knowledge – standardized to 
mean  50  and  standard  deviation  10.  Hence  we  do  not  measure  absolute  but  relative 
achievement gains. Additional information on the test and the test items can be found in Blum 
et al. (2004). Descriptive statistics for test scores, by exam and track type, are shown in 
Table 2. Two results stand out. First, academic track students have on average much higher 
PISA test scores in all tests, independent of the exam type. The difference amounts to one 
standard deviation in the overall test score distribution. Second, students in CEE states have 
higher average PISA test scores, independent of the track type. The difference is between 0.1 
and 0.2 standard deviations. 
For innate learning capacity  iG , we use two proxy variables: an index for cognitive 
skills that is based on test items on figure analogies, as part of a non-verbal IQ-test (German 
revised adaptation of the Thorndike  and Hagan-cognitive abilities test (Heller and Perleth, 
2000)), and a dummy variable that reflects whether a student already had to repeat a grade. 
For general cognitive skills, Table  2  shows a large difference between nonacademic and 
academic  track  students  –  independent  of  the  exam  type  and  repeating  classes  is  more 
common in nonacademic than in academic tracks. However, the general cognitive skills score 
difference  between  the  two  types  of  tracks  is  smaller  than  the  test  score  difference.  An 
explanation for this finding is that the tracked school system in Germany reinforces innate 
ability differences between students. Another important finding is that general skills do not 
differ significantly between students in CEE and non CEE states. 
As indicators of the social background we use the international socio-economic index of 
the highest parental occupational status (HISEI) (Ganzeboom et al., 1992, OECD, 2005) and a 
dummy variable for immigration background that has the value of one if at least one parent 8 
 
was  not  born  in  Germany.  Table  2  shows  that  students  in  academic  track  schools  have 
considerably higher values of the socio-economic index. Further, 12 percent of the academic-
track students in CEE states have a migration background compared to 14 percent in non-
CEE-states. This difference is more pronounced for students in the nonacademic track. While 
in CEE states only 10 percent have a migration background, in non-CEE states the percentage 
amounts to 21 percent.  
 
Table 2. Description of student sample 
  Non-academic students    Academic students 
  CEE    No CEE    CEE    No CEE 
  (N = 1453)    (N = 1146)    (N = 1079)    (N = 1250) 
  Mean  (S.E.)    mean  (S.E.)    mean  (S.E.)    mean  (S.E.) 
HISEI  47.83  (0.58)    49.63  (0.62)    59.36  (0.69)    59.61  (0.69) 
Cognitive skills  46.87  (0.40)    47.22  (0.47)    54.20  (0.55)    53.96  (0.38) 
Immigration background  0.10  (0.01)    0.21  (0.02)    0.12  (0.02)    0.14  (0.01) 
Repeat class  0.21  (0.02)    0.22  (0.02)    0.07  (0.01)    0.10  (0.01) 
Mathematical literacy test grade 9  46.24  (0.44)    44.55  (0.44)    56.39  (0.47)    54.96  (0.39) 
Mathematical literacy test grade 10  46.40  (0.43)    45.47  (0.47)    55.80  (0.48)    54.34  (0.44) 
Mathematical curricular test grade 9  46.11  (0.46)    44.48  (0.51)    56.88  (0.50)    54.75  (0.47) 
Mathematical curricular test grade 10  46.80  (0.45)    43.74  (0.49)    56.53  (0.50)    54.83  (0.44) 
CEE: central exit exams 




Table 3 shows our regression results. The first two models show regression results with 
mathematical literacy in grade 10 as dependent variable. In model (1) we restrict the sample 
to students in nonacademic tracks, whereas model (2) includes only students in academic 
track schools. The main finding is that there are only small and insignificant coefficients of 
central exit examinations on mathematical literacy in grade 10. In fact, in model (1) the point 
estimate for students who graduate after grade 10 from nonacademic tracks is even negative. 
Put differently, there is no evidence that central exit examinations in mathematics improve 
mathematical literacy. 
With respect to our control variables we briefly note that, as expected, general cognitive 
ability is a highly significant predictor of mathematical literacy. Also, students who did not 
repeat  a  class  until  grade  9  have  significantly  higher  achievement  gains.  The  strongest 
predictor for mathematical literacy in grade 10 is mathematical literacy in grade 9. Students 9 
 
with parents of higher socio-economic status have slightly higher test scores in mathematical 
literacy but the coefficients are not significant. Similarly, immigration background has a small 
but insignificant effect. Most likely, the effects of the social background are absorbed by 
general cognitive ability and by test scores measured in grade 9. The gap in mathematical 
literacy is not further widened in grade 10 (e.g., Ai, 2002; Scott et al., 1995).  
In models (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the score on the curricular knowledge 
test. In contrast to our results for mathematical literacy, we now find a highly significant 
positive effect of central exit exams on achievement gains in the curriculum-based knowledge 
test. However, this finding is constrained to students who graduate after grade 10, i.e., for 
students  in  the  nonacademic  track.  For  academic  track  students  the  CEE  effect  remains 
insignificant and fairly weak. There are two possible explanations for this lack of effect. First, 
academic track students have more time until graduation which weakens any incentive effects 
if students discount the future. Second, even if exams at the end of the academic track school 
are not administered centrally, there is an exit exam. These exams are subject to the approval 
by  the  supervisory  authority,  so  that  teachers  are  not  entirely  free  in  setting  up  the  test 
problems. Hence there might be some effect of the non-central exit exam as well. 
 
Table 3. Value-added regression of student achievement 
  Mathematical literacy test    Mathematical curricular test 
  Nonacademic track    Academic track    Nonacademic track    Academic track 
  Model 1    Model 2    Model 3    Model 4 
  b  (S.E.)    b  (S.E.)    b  (S.E.)    b  (S.E.) 
Mathematical literacy grade 9  0.62***  (0.05)    0.62***  (0.06)    0.69***  (0.05)    0.68***  (0.05) 
Cognitive skills  0.20***  (0.03)    0.16***  (0.03)    0.12***  (0.03)    0.08***  (0.03) 
No repeat class  0.83**  (0.33)    1.31**  (0.56)    0.69*  (0.38)    0.91  (0.57) 
HISEI  0.01  (0.01)    0.02  (0.01)    0.02  (0.01)    0.03***  (0.01) 
No immigration background  0.24  (0.39)    0.59  (0.55)    0.18  (0.39)    1.17***  (0.42) 
Central exit exams  -0.13  (0.36)    0.29  (0.41)    1.95***  (0.33)    0.22  (0.41) 
R
2  0.57       0.50       0.61       0.57    
N  1453      1146      1079      1250   
S.E.: standard error of the mean 
* p < 0.10 
** p< 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
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In terms of control variables, we find again that general cognitive ability and test scores in grade 
9 are the strongest predictors for test scores in grade 10. However, compared to the results 
obtained for mathematical literacy in (1) and (2), the relative importance of the grade 9 test score 
grows and the influence of general cognitive skills decreases. This is a plausible result, because 
we  expect  general  cognitive  ability  to  be  a  better  predictor  of  general  skills  (mathematical 
literacy) than of specific skills (curricular knowledge). 
For academic track students, family background is statistically significant in explaining 
achievement gains in curricular knowledge. For nonacademic track students family background 
remains insignificant. This is noteworthy because students in academic track schools tend to 
come from families with comparably high socioeconomic status and only a small proportion of 
students with a migration background attend the academic track. Hence one might expect the 
differences in socio-economic background to be more relevant for nonacademic track students. 
This is not the case. The socioeconomic gap in academic achievement continues to widen for 
academic track schools, possibly because parents with a high socio-economic status can either 
help their children themselves or organize and finance coaching to prepare for the exams. By the 
same  token,  having  a  migration  background  is  detrimental  for  progress  in  curriculum-based 
knowledge for academic track students.  
In summary, our analysis in this section suggests that achievement gains in mathematical 
literacy  between  grades  9  and  10  are  not  larger  in  states  with  central  exit  exams.  Gains  in 
curricular knowledge, however, are significantly larger in states with central exit exams, but only 
for students who finish school after grade 10. This insight is important for our understanding of 
the mechanics of central exams. If students are tested centrally and students and teachers know 
that  the  command  of  curricular  knowledge  is  tested,    curricular  knowledge  increases. 
Mathematical literacy (as a broader concept) is not in the focus of the curriculum and hence the 
exit exam. Thus there are no strong incentives to improve on the students’ literacy skills. This is 
consistent with the education literature: Teachers teach the curriculum if the curriculum is tested 
(Au, 2007; Jacob, 2005). 
We interpret our result as an argument in favor of CEEs, as the results show that students 
have a better knowledge of the material they are tested on, which is defined in the curriculum. In 
Germany the curriculum is binding on the state level and teachers cannot adjust the number of 
mathematics lessons and divert resources from other subjects to mathematics. The number of 
mathematics lessons is fixed and mathematics teachers rarely teach a second subject in the same 
class. Hence with our data, we get an estimate of the net CEE effect.  The analysis also shows 11 
 
that one has to be precise about the contents of the curriculum or the abilities that students are 
expected to have at the end of schooling. Mathematical literacy is not automatically improved if 
the curriculum requires fairly abstract technical and conceptual modeling abilities. To increase 
mathematical literacy, one might think about means on how to include literacy in the exit exams 
and also in the curriculum.  
 
5. Effect of exit exams on teacher attitudes and behavior 
 
5.1 Empirical Strategy 
 
Having found a positive effect of central exit exams in nonacademic track schools for 
curriculum-based knowledge, we now try to identify possible explanations for the CEE-effect 
(Jürges, Richter, and Schneider, 2005; Jürges and Schneider, 2009). In particular, it might be 
argued  that  CEEs  enhance  the  quality  of  teaching  and  therefore  raise  student  achievement 
(Scheerens,  2000;  Scheerens  and  Bosker,  1997).  Teaching  quality,  however,  is  not  directly 
measurable, but PISA-I-Plus contains rich information on teacher attitudes and behavior that was 
collected  in  a  supplementary  teacher  questionnaire  in  2003.  In  this  section,  we  analyze 
differences in teacher attitudes and behavior between states with and without central exit exams. 
Note, however, that the available information can only serve as more or less useful proxies for 
the quality of teaching (Seidel and Shavelson, 2007). Hence our results ought to be interpreted 
with some caution.  
We restrict our analytical sample to mathematics teachers who taught the tested students in 
grades 9 and 10. This ensures that classes have been taught by the same teacher between the two 
tests. Our sample restriction leaves us with a sample of 134 teachers or classes, respectively. 69 
of these classes are in states with central exit exams and the remaining 65 classes are in states 
without central exit exams. We also compare teacher attitudes and behavior of teachers who did 
not  teach  a  centrally  tested  subject.  For  this  purpose,  we  selected  56  science  teachers,  who 
reported  not  to  teach  German,  mathematics  or  English.  Using  this  control  group  allows  to 
strengthen our results.  If central  exit exams  affect  teaching, the effect  should exist  only for 
teachers, who teach subjects that are tested centrally, i.e. mathematics teachers. Students in the 
nonacademic track schools are typically not tested centrally in science. Hence we expect to find 
no differences in science teacher attitudes and behavior between states with and without exit 
exams. The only exception for the nonacademic track is Saxony, where science is also tested 12 
 
centrally.  Therefore  science  teachers  from  Saxony  are  not  included  in  the  control  group.  In 
Bavaria, some students are tested in physics but not in other sciences. We decided to include the 
Bavarian teachers in the sample because it is not clear which teachers are affected. Moreover, 
since we expect science teachers not to be affected by CEEs as opposed to mathematics teachers, 
including some teachers who are affected by CEEs in the control group will bias our results 
towards zero and against finding a CEE effect. For teachers in the academic track, where both 
science and mathematics might be a tested subject in the exit exam, no differences between the 
types of teachers are expected.  
Overall, we used 76 items from the teacher questionnaire to measure attitudes and behavior 
of mathematics and science teachers. From these items, we constructed indices for six different 
dimensions:  performance  orientation,  teacher  cooperation,  effective  time  use,  fostering  of 
learning and disciplinary climate, parent involvement, and use of evaluation methods. Table 4 
contains variable definitions and descriptive statistics by type of exit examinations and school 
type. 
The basic specification for our regression is: 
 
(3)  c c c c X d y  
 
where  c y  is the (z-standardized) attitudes score for teacher c,  c d  is a dummy variable for central 
exit  exams,  and  c X   denotes  average  general  cognitive  ability,  socio-economic  status, 
immigration background of the students in the class, and the size of the school of teacher c.  
Using a subset of 15 items, we also identified three types of teachers (active, performance 
oriented, passive) by latent class analysis (for details see Senkbeil, 2006). This classification 
allows us to study possible effects of exit exams on the six dimensions of teacher attitudes and 
behavior simultaneously. "Active" teachers (41 percent of the sample) have high values in all of 
the  dimensions  mentioned  above.  "Performance  oriented"  teachers  (also  41  percent  of  the 
sample) stress performance and effective time use, but are less interested in cooperation and 
evaluation. "Passive teachers" (18 percent) have low scores on all of the six dimensions shown 
above.  We  test  for  differences  in  teacher  types  across  different  types  of  exams  by  cross-
tabulation and using the chi-squared test.  13 
 
Table 4. Description of teacher variables   
        Non-academic students    Academic students 
        CEE    Non CEE    CEE    Non CEE 




Example item  Mean  (S.E.)    mean  (S.E.)    mean  (S.E.)    mean  (S.E.) 
Mathematics teachers                             
Parent involvement  5  0.69  I want parents to talk to the teachers as often as possible.  0.05  (0.17)    0.04  (0.18)    -0.08  (0.17)    -0.05  (0.18) 
Use of evaluation methods  20  0.88  There are defined standards for each class level at our school.   0.02  (0.18)    -0.05  (0.15)    -0.13  (0.15)    0.15  (0.20) 
Fostering of learning / 
disciplinary climate 
9  0.82  We monitor the pupils’ performance consistently.   0.16  (0.14)    -0.38  (0.16)    0.46  (0.20)    -0.17  (0.18) 
Teacher cooperation  20  0.90  How many times do you meet with mathematics teachers to 
discuss or plan content of the curriculum or teaching methods? 
0.25  (0.17)    -0.14  (0.14)    -0.22  (0.17)    0.02  (0.21) 
Performance orientation  12  0.82  High demands are made on the pupils at our school.  0.28  (0.14)    -0.38  (0.16)    0.19  (0.17)    -0.12  (0.21) 
Effective time use  10  0.71  It is important to us to free up as much working time as 
possible.  
0.12  (0.15)    -0.09  (0.18)    0.10  (0.18)    -0.15  (0.19) 
 
Science teachers 
          
 
   
 
   
 
   
Parent involvement  5  0.69  I want parents to talk to the teachers as often as possible.  0.12  (0.25)    -0.13  (0.24)    0.46  (0.32)    -0.21  (0.26) 
Use of evaluation methods  20  0.88  There are defined standards for each class level at our school.  0.02  (0.31)    -0.01  (0.21)    -0.03  (0.41)    0.01  (0.20) 
Fostering of learning / 
disciplinary climate 
9  0.82  We try to understand the problems of the pupils.  -0.21  (0.29)    0.19  (0.21)    0.44  (0.40)    -0.29  (0.21) 
 
Teacher cooperation  20  0.90  How many times do you meet with other teachers to discuss or 
plan content of the curriculum or teaching methods? 
0.14  (0.26)    0.08  (0.24)    -0.32  (0.46)    -0.21  (0.19) 
Performance orientation  12  0.82  High demands are made on the pupils at our school.  -0.05  (0.23)    -0.08  (0.23)    0.32  (0.52)    0.06  (0.27) 
Effective time use  5  0.71  It is important to us to free up as much working time as 
possible.  




Table 5 shows the estimation results for the effect of exit examinations separately for 
each  of  the  six  teacher  characteristics.  In  non-academic  track,  we  find  that  mathematics 
teachers  in  CEE  states  generally  rely  more  heavily  on  discipline  and  achievement.  With 
respect to the other dimensions, there are no significant differences between CEE and non 
CEE-states.  As  expected,  science  teachers  in  the  nonacademic  track  show  no  significant 
differences in attitude and behavior. Academic track teachers in CEE states are more engaged 
in  fostering  the  learning  and  disciplinary  climate.  This  difference  is  significant  for 
mathematics and science teachers. In addition science teachers in CEE-states appear to have a 
more  effective  time  use.  Regarding  performance  orientation  we  find  no  significant 
differences. 
In Table 6 we show the distribution of teacher "types" by exam regime, separately for 
mathematics and science teachers. Mathematics teachers in nonacademic tracks who teach in 
states with central exit exams are significantly more often "active" or "performance oriented", 
and less often "passive" than mathematics teachers in states without central exit exams. In 
contrast, mathematics teachers in academic tracks who teach in states with central exit exams 
are  about  equally  likely  to  be  either  "active",  "performance  oriented"  or  "passive".  Also, 
science teachers in both academic and non-academic tracks show no significant differences 
across exam types.  
To summarize the results in this section, we find some evidence for differences between 
teachers that are exposed to central exit exams and teachers who are not. The main difference 
identified  with  our  data  is  the  promotion  of  positive  learning  and  disciplinary  climate. 
Moreover, the proportion of active or performance oriented teachers is higher in nonacademic 
track schools in CEE states. Teachers in academic track schools are more similar with respect 
to our measured dimensions.  
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Table 5. Differences in teacher attitudes and behavior
a 
  Mathematics 
teachers 
  Science teachers 
  Mean CEE minus 
non-CEE 
  Mean CEE 
minus non-CEE 
  d  t    d  t 
Non-academic track           
Parent involvement  -0.12  0.446    -0.44  1.090 
Use of evaluation methods  -0.10  0.382    -0.34  0.789 
Fostering of learning/disciplinary climate  0.41*  1.674    -0.66  1.529 
Teacher cooperation  0.17  0.740    -0.29  0.759 
Performance orientation  0.44*  1.887    0.21  0.599 
Effective time use  0.20  0.776    0.09  0.200 
                
Academic track               
Parent involvement  -0.03  0.316    1.30  1.643 
Use of evaluation methods  -0.32  1.132    0.65  0.716 
Fostering of learning/disciplinary climate  0.68**  2.368    1.28**  2.406 
Teacher cooperation  -0.40  1.362    0.68  1.010 
Performance orientation  0.29  0.982    -0.67  0.584 
Effective time use  0.19  0.619    1.51*  1.868 
a Controlling for cognitive ability, socio-economic status and immigration background of the students, sex and 
age of the teachers and school size. 
* p < 0.10 
** p< 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
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Table 6. Distribution of teacher types 
  Mathematics teachers    Science teachers 


















                 
CEE  54.76  35.71  9.52  12.27***    33.33  44.44  22.22  1.20 
Non CEE  19.44  47.22  33.33       38.10  52.38  9.52    
                   
Academic 
track 
                 
CEE  29.63  62.96  7.41  1.86    33.33  50.00  16.67  0.58 
Non CEE  44.83  44.83  10.34       18.18  54.55  27.27    
* p < 0.10 
** p< 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
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6. Effect of exit exams on student attitudes 
 
6.1 Empirical Strategy 
 
In this section, we use data from the student questionnaires to construct four indices of 
student attitudes in (grade 9) with respect to the learning climate in mathematics: Emotions 
(anger, anxiety, boredom, despair, achievement pressure), work habits (effort, completion of 
homework,  attention  in  lessons),  motivation  (instrumental  motivation,  enjoyment, 
performance  orientation),  and  self  esteem  (self  efficacy,  self  concept).  Table  7  contains 
variable definitions and descriptive statistics by type of exit examinations and school type. 
Note that values for each item were z-standardized. Positive values correspond to higher than 
average agreement, negative values correspond to less than average agreement. 
 
Our basic regression model is: 
 
(4)  iGc iGc iGc iGc iGc e X d a r , 
 
where attitudes r reported by student i in grade G in class c are modeled as a function of 
general cognitive ability a, the exam regime d and background variables X (socioeconomic 
and migration background). Again, cognitive ability is approximated by the cognitive skills 
score and a dummy variable that indicates whether the student has repeated a class. Ability 
and background are included as control variables they might not only affect achievement but 
also motivation and the self perception with respect to mathematics.  
 
6.2  Results 
 
Table 8 summarizes the results. It turns out that the differences in student traits and attitudes 
are fairly small in magnitude. Nevertheless, students in states with central exit exams show 
significantly more often negative emotions like anger, anxiety, achievement pressure and 
despair and the self-concept in mathematical competence is relatively weak. This is in 
particular true for students who are at the end of the nonacademic track, but differences are 
also significant for students in the academic track.    18 
 
Table 7. Sample description of students` attitudes 
        Non-academic students    Academic students 
        CEE    Non CEE    CEE    Non CEE 
  #  of 
items 
Alpha  Example item  mean  (S.E.)    mean  (S.E.)    mean  (S.E.)    mean  (S.E.) 
Emotions                             
Anger  5  0.82  I am annoyed that mathematics is so hard.  0.14  (0.03)    -0.12  (0.05)    0.06  (0.05)    -0.13  (0.05) 
Anxiety  9  0.89  Right before mathematics exams I am very nervous.  0.15  (0.04)    -0.08  (0.04)    0.02  (0.04)    -0.16  (0.04) 
Boredom  5  0.86  I am very bored during mathematics classes.  0.02  (0.04)    -0.08  (0.04)    0.08  (0.04)    -0.03  (0.06) 
Despair  5  0.88  During mathematics exams the idea to give up is very appealing.  0.14  (0.03)    -0.10  (0.04)    0.01  (0.04)    -0.11  (0.04) 
Achievement pressure  6  0.79  It is very important to my parents for me to be good at mathematics.  0.18  (0.04)    0.05  (0.06)    -0.11  (0.06)    -0.19  (0.05) 
Work habits                                        
Effort  5  0.80  I put a lot of effort into mathematics to understand everything.  0.01  (0.03)    0.05  (0.03)    -0.05  (0.04)    -0.03  (0.04) 
Completion  of 
homework 
10  0.72 
I always try to solve all the problems in my mathematics homework. 
-0.01  (0.04)    0.14  (0.03)    -0.17  (0.03)    0.02  (0.04) 
Attention in lessons  3  0.76  Even if the subject in mathematics is very difficult I put all my effort 
into understanding it. 
-0.05  (0.04)    0.13  (0.03)    -0.13  (0.04)    0.06  (0.05) 
Motivation                                        
Instrumental 
motivation 
4  0.82  I see that mathematics will be very expedient in my future job, so I 
apply myself to it. 
0.00  (0.03)    0.08  (0.04)    -0.11  (0.05)    0.01  (0.04) 
Enjoyment  6  0.92  Mathematics is fun.  -0.04  (0.05)    0.17  (0.04)    -0.16  (0.05)    0.03  (0.06) 
Performance 
orientation 
3  0.62 
I want my grades to be good so I make an effort to achieve that. 
0.05  (0.04)    0.03  (0.03)    -0.05  (0.03)    -0.05  (0.04) 
Self Esteem                                        
Self efficacy  8  0.81  I can calculate how much cheaper a TV set is at a 30% discount.  -0.24  (0.03)    -0.20  (0.04)    0.25  (0.05)    0.31  (0.04) 
Self concept  5  0.92  I keep up easily in mathematics.  -0.09  (0.04)    0.13  (0.04)    -0.11  (0.04)    0.10  (0.04) 
CEE: central exit exams 
S.E.: standard error of the mean 19 
 
Table 8. Differences in student attitudes by exam type
a 
  Non-academic students    Academic students 
  Mean CEE minus Non-CEE    Mean CEE minus Non-CEE 
  d  t    d  T 
Emotions           
Anger  0.24***  3.899    0.21***  2.945 
Anxiety  0.20***  3.796    0.17**  2.620 
Boredom  0.09  1.361    0.10  1.483 
Despair  0.20***  3.512    0.13**  2.114 
Achievement pressure  0.18**  2.284    0.12  1.437 
Work habits               
Effort  -0.05  -1.086    -0.03  -0.598 
Completion of homework  -0.15***  -2.857    -0.22***  -4.246 
Attention in lessons  -0.14***  -2.801    -0.20***  -3.025 
Motivation             
Instrumental motivation  -0.06  -1.086    -0.11**  -2.023 
Enjoyment  -0.18***  -2.724    -0.18**  -2.253 
Performance orientation  0.02  0.435    -0.01  -0.128 
Self Esteem                 
Self efficacy  -0.01  -0.194    -0.04  -0.668 
Self concept  -0.18***  -3.127    -0.20***  -3.454 
a Controlling for the socioeconomic background, migration background, the cognitive skills of the student and whether the 
student has repeated a class 
* p < 0.10 
** p< 0.05 
*** p < 0.01 
  
Differences in motivational orientation (for instance joy, homework) are also significant. It is 
striking that differences between CEE and non-CEE states are primarily significant when they 
relate to negative student attitudes. The expected positive effects from more effective and 
achievement  oriented  teaching  are  at  least  not  perceived  by  the  students.  Moreover, 
differences between CEE and non-CEE states prevail as well for academic track students. 
Recall that neither achievement nor teacher characteristics differed between academic track 
schools. 
Our results are in line with recent studies in which standardised tests (or high-stake 
tests)  are  understood  as  a  highly  controlling  extrinsic  motivation  strategy.  Although  this 
strategy was often found to have the desired effect (better performance), it often also had a 
number of undesirable side effects, e.g. loss of intrinsic subject motivation, increased test 
anxiety, increased pressure to perform, lower self-efficacy (Abrams et al., 2003; Ryan, Ryan, 




may indicate that central exit examinations do not have a homogenous effect on all students: 
while they provide an (external) incentive to achieve their maximum performance in a test 
situation for some students, other students (in particular, those who do not have much self-
confidence in their own abilities) may see them as a threat or a hurdle which they cannot 
manage and this then leads to the undesirable side effects on motivation mentioned above (cf., 
e.g. Abrams et al., 2003; Kellaghan et al., 1996; Ryan et al., 2007). It is surprising, however, 
that these negative effects are also found among students of academic tracks. The undesirable 
effects  on  students’  motivation  possibly  occur  independent  of  teacher  characteristics  and 
behaviour.  
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
Using data from the German PISA-I-Plus study of 2003, we have analyzed the effect of 
central exit exams in mathematics on students’ mathematics performance, students’ attitudes 
towards mathematics, and mathematics teachers’ attitudes and behavior. The PISA-I-Plus data 
are  superior  to  data  used  in  earlier  studies  for  two  reasons.  First,  they  contain  repeated 
measures  of performance in  grades  9 and 10 (when exams  take place), so  that we  could 
measure actual gains  in  achievement. Second, the data also  allow differentiating  between 
achievement on a mathematical literacy test and a test of curricular knowledge. While central 
exit exams significantly increase curricular knowledge of students, we found no significant 
effect on mathematical literacy – the type of mathematical knowledge that is regarded to be 
relevant in everyday situations. This paper thus qualifies earlier findings on the central exam 
effect  in  Germany  in  an  important  way:  measured  (incentive)  effects  of  central  exit 
examination  appear  to  be  larger  when  outcome  measures  are  more  in  line  with  what  is 
actually tested in central exit examinations. 
Only few previous studies have attempted to shed light on the question what is driving 
the  positive  achievement  gains  of  central  exit  exams.  Theoretically,  teachers  as  well  as 
students should react to central exit exams by increasing effort. Empirical results are less 
clear. For instance, using student-provided data on teaching styles from TIMSS 1995, Jürges 
and Schneider (2009) find no differences in teaching practices other than teachers in CEE-
states giving and checking homework more often. However, students might not be the best 
judges of the quality of schooling (Kunter and Baumert, 2006). In contrast to the international 




teacher attitudes provided by the teachers themselves. Using these data, we find evidence that 
central exit exams have an (albeit limited) effect on teachers. Teachers tend to be more active 
and performance oriented when their students have to pass a central exit exam. Using student 
self-ratings on behavior, motivation, and attitudes towards learning mathematics, Jürges and 
Schneider  (2009)  find  differences  in  general  student  motivation.  There  appears  to  be  a 
downside to CEEs because students in CEE-states do like mathematics less. They find it less 
easy and more boring than those in non-CEE states. The present study confirms findings that 
central exit exams are associated with negative student attitudes: students in CEE-states are 
generally more anxious, feel higher achievement pressure, and are actually less motivated to 
learn. 
In a further step of analysis  – not reported in detail – we also analyzed whether the 
achievement gains we saw earlier can be explained by differences in teacher attitudes and 
behavior across states with and without central exit exams. In other words, we tried to figure 
out  whether  effects  of  central  exit  exams  on  teachers  carry  over  to  higher  achievement. 
However, we were not able to find strong support of the hypothesis that teacher variables 
have this mediating effect. One problem might be that the answers to the subjective teacher 
questions are hard to compare across states. Since there is only limited mobility of teachers 
across states, the (self)-assessment of teacher characteristics depends on the characteristics of 
the  peer  group  of  teachers  subject  to  central  exit  exams.  If  for  instance  performance 
orientation in CEE states is, for whatever reason, generally higher in CEE-states, the answers 
might  not  be  comparable  across  states.  Another  problem  could  be  that  the  available 
information does not capture the relevant aspects of teacher quality. Also, CEEs might simply 
not improve achievement because of higher teaching quality, but because of more student 
effort. In that case, students alone bear the cost of higher achievement. Even given the (rich) 
data in PISA-I 2003, we are still not able to give a final answer to the question why CEEs 
increase performance. 
One important result of this paper is that differences in achievement due to central exit 
exams are typically found only in nonacademic tracks. Students and teachers in academic 
track schools appear to be less affected. There are various possible explanations for this result. 
One explanation is the difference in years until graduation that is reducing the CEE-effect. 
Another explanation is that (centrally approved) exit exams exist for students at academic 
track  schools  in  all  German  states,  even  though  they  are  not  centrally  drafted  and 




central exit exams. The most degrees of freedom with respect to the academic level required 
for graduation exist in lower level (basic track) secondary schools, where no formal exit exam 
is required, although there are of course exams during the final grade. Overall, the results of 
this study support the monitoring of student achievement by standardized tests at all levels of 
schooling and all levels of tracks, as that enhances performance. 
 The results also suggest that if achievement is monitored e.g. by central exit exams, 
teachers do in fact teach the curriculum, whereas mathematical literacy (as a broader concept) 
does not automatically improve. Notably, these differences between curricular and literacy 
tests are in accordance with recent findings from the US (e.g. Amrein and Berliner, 2002; 
Klein  et  al.,  2000;  Neil  and  Gaylor,  2001),  where  state-mandated  exams  were  found  to 
increase performance measured in terms of the curriculum but not necessarily in terms of a 
deeper  understanding  of  mathematical  concepts  that  enables  students  to  actually  use 
mathematics in everyday life. To improve the quality of education by central exit exams thus 
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